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Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s speech at the Spring meeting of the National Defence Course Association

Government Communications Department
Publication date 30.3.2017 18.15 | Published in English on 31.3.2017 at 13.55
Speech

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Mission: European security


Members of the National Defence Course Association,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Last weekend, I participated in a memorable event in Rome with the other EU leaders. We celebrated the treaties signed in 1957, 60 years ago, that created the foundation of today’s European Union.

As we well know, European integration in the 1950s was built as a peace project, in the wake of two world wars. Europeans had waged war with each other in the most horrifying way. Many societies, economies and human lives were in tatters after the wars. Do we still remember, however, why wars were waged in Europe at that time?

In the history of nations, sixty, seventy years is not a long time. Human memory, unfortunately, moves in shorter cycles, and therefore the bigger picture is often forgotten.

Although, in the European Union, there is a certain kind of tug of war evident in everyday politics even now, the major cornerstone of integration has, however, been maintained: a united Europe has managed to enjoy a period of peace and increasing prosperity for several decades. For many, this has become a matter of course, and ironically it is true that when an issue becomes a matter of course, it ends up in the danger zone. Caring for and nurturing it become incidental. Gratitude for it is forgotten.

In recent years, Europe has woken up to the fact that everything is no longer as it was. The rest of the world no longer looks upon us as a shining example of the arrangement of societies and values, but also as an out-dated, even declining continent. To secure our external borders, constructive dialogue and developing economic relations with our neighbours are no longer enough. The divides within our societies have also begun to sharpen and even become inflamed.

As we stated in last week’s Rome Declaration: “The European Union today is facing unprecedented challenges, both global and domestic: regional conflicts, terrorism, growing migratory pressures, protectionism and social and economic inequalities.”

European cooperation, which was sailing towards a future of perpetual happiness, has really had to stop and wake up. To such changes, it is absolutely necessary to react – and not only with fine words, but with deeds. We must ask ourselves: Who are we really? What things do we believe in? And what are we ready to do to support them?

Ladies and Gentlemen,

European cooperation is often like an old diesel engine. It starts slowly and begins to turn sluggishly, but on picking up speed it goes decisively forward.

We are in such a situation now. We have uncovered the core essence of today’s European cooperation and we have also promised each other that we will now focus on it. In the Rome Declaration, we summarised the key tasks of the European Union under four headings: a safe and secure Europe; a prosperous and sustainable Europe; a social Europe; a stronger Europe on the global scene.

It is noteworthy that we mentioned a safe and secure Europe first. Strengthening the security of Europe and Europeans is now a task of prime importance to us. This does not mean that we would now like to wrap up Europe in a cloak of armour and close all the shutters. On the contrary, this means strengthening Europe as an open actor that assumes responsibility for itself and its citizens.

This does not only mean strengthening the classical pillars of internal and external security. We also need to look at how each of us builds and defends a safe society. We have, for good reason, shown great concern about the state of our European societies, Finland included. Are all citizens keeping pace with change – young people, the elderly, men, women, migrants, the indigenous population? Do people still feel that our current system is able to deliver the decisions and solutions required today?

I have said before that our system can and must surely be challenged for it to renew itself and perform better. But that challenging must not erode the cornerstones of our democratic society – freedom of expression, tolerance, human rights, respect for common rules. In this, we are confronted by broader fundamental questions of security. Building and defending everyday security in this way is, in these times, the duty of every Finn and European.   

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As I stated above, European integration arose as a peace project. It is telling and explains much about Europe that peace was built and defended for decades particularly through economic cooperation and human interaction. Defence and other security cooperation was discussed, but no real headway was made on the issue.

As so often in life, something had to happen before something finally had to be done. Russia’s actions in Ukraine; the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and elsewhere; the migration crisis. And now, most recently, the US elections, as a result of which a strong message about Europeans bearing a greater share of responsibility has come loud and clear from across the Atlantic.

The message from the United States has been directed primarily at European NATO countries. It does not therefore concern Finland directly, but even so we can pretty much agree with the basic idea: it is important that Europe begins to bear more responsibility for its own security and defence.

Finland has always done this by taking care of its own national defence. As a country that does not belong to a military alliance, we have taken good care of our own home base, but we have also understood that by being well prepared for changes in our own operating environment we also foster security further afield.

In our own statistics, our defence budget is currently 1.3% of GDP, namely EUR 2.8 billion. If, however, we were to use in calculating the GDP share the same calculation method as the NATO countries, the figure would be 1.6%, namely EUR 3.4 billion.

If the planned strategic capability projects, namely the Finnish Navy’s vessel acquisitions and the Finnish Air Force’s fighter purchases, are implemented, the GDP share using our present calculation method will rise to 1.8–2% in the 2020s, and using the NATO countries’ calculation method to 2–2.25% of GDP. So, in the North, there is a strong country that is assuredly not the weakest link in European security.

In speaking about defence budget GDP shares, we move arithmetically in tenths of percentage points. Behind them, however, are significant amounts of very real money, whose effective and transparent use is important. This is the situation in Finland, and this is also true of many nearby European partners, such as Germany.

Tenths of percentage points on the scale of the German economy are really large figures. Germany’s defence spending, indeed, is currently only around 1.2% of GDP, but in monetary terms this means around EUR 37 billion per year. If Germany were tomorrow, in one fell swoop, to increase its defence spending to the NATO country target of 2%, it would have to nearly double its annual defence spending compared with the current situation. By a quick calculation, this would mean a one-off general increase in the country’s annual defence spending of around EUR 25 billion.

NATO countries’ defence is like a potluck dinner party, if such an expression is permitted – there is no common NATO army; each member country brings to the alliance its own capabilities. Additional monetary investments in defence would therefore also be investments expressly in each country’s own capabilities, but thereby also in common goals.

The same applies to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Together, the EU is just as strong as its member states want it to be. And now that strength is needed. After speaking about this issue with a number of my European colleagues, I am convinced that possible increases in national defence budgets in line with NATO targets may also benefit the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

We all, both countries that belong and do not belong to a military alliance, absolutely want to avoid overlaps with NATO cooperation. In the EU and NATO, there is a common understanding that these two actors must complement each other. In Europe, much work remains undone that is highly suited to the EU, for example in developing cyber capabilities and preparing for hybrid operations.

Therefore, I venture to be hopeful that advances seen recently in developing the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy are genuine this time.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Government has submitted to Parliament reports on foreign and security policy and defence policy. The operating environment description of both of them is based on the same analysis. Their key messages about Finland’s policy lines are naturally the same. We state in both reports that the European Union is the key operating framework and an important security community for Finland’s foreign and security policy as well as a community of values for Finland. In Finland’s view, the EU’s solidarity clause and mutual assistance clause strengthen the Union as a security community and increase solidarity between member states.

It is therefore clear that, in the future work of the European Union, Finland’s foreign and security policy objective must be the comprehensive development of the EU as a security community. In Finland’s view, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and defence cooperation must be strengthened. There is now a need for this, and there is now momentum for this. On the one hand, this is in accordance with Finland’s foreign and security policy interests. On the other hand, increasing European cooperation will also support our national defence – whether it concerns developing the use of forces, materiel and infrastructure, supporting the defence industry or responding to new threats. Closer European cooperation will also strengthen the EU’s position as a global player.

Finland has therefore been one of the most active member states in developing the Common Security and Defence Policy. We give a strong contribution to the common process. It has been gratifying to note that the same vision is now shared with us by many other member states, including our most important and closest neighbour Sweden and many NATO countries.

Recently, in public discussion there has been much consideration given to what differentiated or multi-speed development of the Union means.

Finland is also currently involved in all forms of multi-speed cooperation. In addition to everything else, we have shown our strong support for them in these turbulent times for European cooperation, and we have not joined the voices critical of cooperation. We have shown our support, because it is in Finland’s interests. We have done so, because only by being involved can we make a difference. We believe in European cooperation and its strong value base.

We participate in the Schengen Agreement on free movement. We are in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and we were among the first countries to adopt the common currency, the euro. And now we are at the forefront in developing defence cooperation, which may become the next concrete form of multi-speed cooperation.

We accept the multi-speed development of the European Union on two conditions. Firstly, it must take place within the framework of the current Treaty; we do not want to paralyse the Union’s capacity to act with years of treaty negotiations. Secondly, multi-speed development must remain open to all member states, even if progress happens at different times; the unity of the Union is very important to us, and we don’t want to divide member states into Class A and Class B members. In other words, even if only a small group of countries, Finland included, were to start to deepen security and defence cooperation, all others would also be welcome to participate at a later date.

What then could this differentiated cooperation in the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy be like? I see that there may be different modules, in which each willing member state may participate in accordance with their own needs and capabilities. As I stated earlier, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy relies on cooperation between the member states: there is no, and will not be, a common army, but by combining member states’ own contributions a robust offering may be achieved.

Based on the course outlined last year, including at the December European Council, work has been under way since the beginning of the year on three issues: crisis management planning and conduct capability, permanent structured cooperation, and annual review of defence.

What then do these issues encompass?

Most progress has been made on the first mentioned of these, namely the planning and conduct capability of the EU’s crisis management operations. The efficient implementation of crisis management operations requires that the EU has at its disposal the necessary organizational and staff arrangements. The problem to date has been the fragmentation of arrangements. The EU Foreign Affairs Council decided earlier this month on the first concrete measure: within the EU Military Staff in Brussels will be established a Military Planning and Conduct Capability, which will be responsible for military training missions. From the Finnish perspective, it is gratifying that it will be headed by Director General of the EU Military Staff, Lt General Esa Pulkkinen. EU Training Missions are currently under way in three African countries – the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia.

This is, however, only the first, small but important, step. Finland’s longer-term goal is a permanent staff structure, which would cover both military and civilian crisis management missions. This would also be needed to enable the EU to respond better to the tasks it has set for itself in its global strategy.

The second of the issues I mentioned is permanent structured cooperation. This sounds a little like EU jargon, but it is worth patiently considering each word in turn, because it is a really important issue.

Permanent structured cooperation concerns a mechanism for military cooperation in defence capabilities. Those member states which fulfil the higher criteria for defence capabilities and which have made closer commitments with each other will be entitled to initiate cooperation within the framework of the Union. The mechanism therefore facilitates cooperation undertaken in separately agreed areas and in which all member states will not necessarily participate.

Permanent structured cooperation projects may focus either on developing new capabilities or better utilisation of existing ones. Concrete projects have not yet been proposed by member states – with the exception of Germany, from which one can conclude that it is highly committed to developing European cooperation. It has already proposed, on a general level, permanent structured cooperation relating to crisis management missions – such as medical supplies, logistics or satellite imaging cooperation.

In Finland’s view, it is important, however, that permanent structured cooperation is not limited only to crisis management, but covers defence cooperation more broadly. Finland will make its own proposals for a permanent structured cooperation framework later this spring.

It is clear that our proposals will be linked to what we have already outlined nationally, for example in the defence report. We state in the section of the report relating to EU cooperation: “Sectors important to Finland include, inter alia, crisis management, providing and receiving assistance, responding to hybrid threats, developing defence cooperation and capabilities, creating arrangements for security of supply as well as strengthening the defence industrial and technological base.”

The most significant divide in discussion relating to permanent structured cooperation currently concerns whether to prioritise the more ambitious progress of willing and able countries or to try and keep the threshold for participation low and to involve all of the member states. The European External Action Service has proposed a two-tier model that strives to combine both perspectives: the first tier would be a general structure and administration common to all, and the second tier would consist of individual projects in which member states would participate based on their own points of departure. Finland also supports this two-tier model – therefore, in principle, permanent structured cooperation open to all, in which countries decide project by project where to cooperate.

It is worth recalling that permanent structured cooperation was already agreed in the Lisbon Treaty, but it is only now that it is being translated into practical collaboration.

The third issue developed at the beginning of the year concerns the annual review of defence. This will help make EU defence cooperation more systematic and binding. In Finland’s view, the review must fulfil two tasks: it must promote fulfilment of EU-level capability objectives and it must provide member states with a forum for the coordination of national planning.

The above-mentioned three issues will now be worked on ahead of the next milestones: the May Foreign Affairs Council, and the June European Council.

And the work will also continue in other directions. In addition to the issues I have mentioned, during the spring work will continue on enhancing the EU’s military and civilian crisis management, tightening EU–NATO cooperation, and implementing the Commission’s European Defence Action Plan.

In relation to this, the Commission will prepare a more detailed proposal on the establishment of a defence fund. This European Defence Fund would include a so-called research window and capability window. As its name suggests, the research window would include funding for joint research in the field of security and defence policy.

In terms of the capability window, there are plans for a financial tool allowing participating member states to develop and purchase certain assets together to reduce their costs. It would be financed by combining participating countries’ national appropriations, supplemented where possible with EU budget funds. Participation in the fund would once again be voluntary, in other words each country would assess its participation based on its own defence policy points of departure. Finland would consider more extensive utilisation of EU funding in the defence sector to be a worthwhile idea.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy may bring real added value to member states, supplementing countries’ own national capabilities and their other international commitments. On the EU side, it may be possible to do things that, for example, NATO does not do. I have already mentioned, in particular, the development of cyber security capabilities and preparing for hybrid operations. Both concern societies’ development of extensive preparedness and vigilance, and their resistance and endurance in situations in which new types of threats, including non-military threats, are directed at them.

Cyber security is essentially related to the security of an electronic and networked society; the significance of this will only grow as digitalisation and the internet of things advance. Hybrid influence is, by definition, systematic activity in which a state or non-state actor may simultaneously utilise various military means or, for example, financial or technology-based means of coercion as well as information operations and social media, and thereby strive to influence weaknesses of the target state and to achieve its own objectives.

Such development and defence of societies’ broad security are excellently suited to the fundamental nature of the European Union and also to its current tasks. I spoke at the beginning of my speech about the Rome Declaration and the key tasks outlined in it, of which the first was a secure and protected Europe. I stated that in addition to strengthening the classic pillars of internal and external security, we must also look at how each of us builds and defends a safe society. I said that building and defending everyday security in this way is, in these times, the duty of every Finn and European. Our civic skills should include literacy in new threats and influence operations.

We can also build such expertise through European and wider international cooperation. Finland has advanced to the forefront on this issue. The establishment in Helsinki of a Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats has progressed quickly in recent months, led by Finland. This centre of excellence is also a key part of the implementation of the EU–NATO joint declaration. More than a dozen EU and NATO countries, as well as the European External Action Service and the NATO Secretariat, have participated in the preparatory meetings.

The objective of the centre is to develop preparedness and capabilities to counter hybrid threats as well as to increase understanding of hybrid threats and the vulnerabilities of societies. The main areas of activity will be strategic level analysis, consulting, training and exercises as well as network-based cooperation. Work relating to networks will be planned to address hybrid influence and terrorism-related hybrid operations as well as preparedness and resilience, namely the resistance and endurance of societies, which I already mentioned.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I return once again to last weekend’s Rome Declaration, and I quote:

“We have built a unique Union with common institutions and strong values: a community of peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, a major economic power with unparalleled levels of social protection and welfare.

European unity started as the dream of a few, it became the hope of the many. Then Europe became one again. Today, we are united and stronger: hundreds of millions of people across Europe benefit from living in an enlarged Union that has overcome the old divides.”

Every day, we are building and defending this European Union, Europe, our common home. Its security is indivisible – yours, mine, our security.

Members of the National Defence Course Association,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I want to thank you for the invitation to address this spring meeting of the National Defence Course Association – it is always a pleasure and an honour to share ideas with such an eminent group. Let the discussion continue.